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The ‘Hemisphere Isolationists’ and Anglo-American 
Economic Diplomacy during the Second World War 
 
Throughout the Second World War a central component of the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
administration’s post-war planning was an attempt to win the support of Great 
Britain for a multilateral economic system, based on the internationalist principles of 
free and equal access to the world’s markets and resources. This paper explores the 
impact on Anglo-American economic diplomacy of a faction within the Roosevelt 
administration, defined as ‘hemisphere isolationists’. United by a preoccupation with 
Latin American affairs, alongside an instinctive disdain for the European powers, this 
group pursued policies which had the effect of excluding British interests from Latin 
America for the post-war era. As such, they represented a regionalist challenge to 
broader internationalist conceptions of the post-war world.  
 
The years following the entry of the United States into the Second World War have often 
been characterised as witnessing the triumph of internationalism in the country. In this 
analysis the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 finally forced the US to 
abandon its former isolationism, which had shaped the country’s foreign policy over the 
previous decades. In its place the US took the leading role during the war years in the 
construction of a new world order, based on internationalist principles. The most dramatic 
expression of this polity came in the US support for an international organisation, based on 
collective security, to preserve world peace.1    
Such internationalist principles can also be construed in the Franklin D. Roosevelt 
administration’s advocacy of a multilateral economic system for the post-war world, based on 
free and equal access for all nations to the world’s markets and resources. The chief 
proponents of this system were a group of economic internationalists in the State Department, 
led by Secretary of State Cordell Hull.2 The motivation behind economic multilateralism, 
according to this group, went way beyond the realm of commerce. Rather, advocates of 
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multilateralsim believed the freer trade achieved by nations would lead to greater prosperity 
for all. Such prosperity, so the argument went, would eliminate the bases of the economic 
nationalism that had ultimately led to war.3 Economic multilateralism, then, would pave the 
way for lasting international peace. Understood in this way, the Roosevelt administration’s 
economic ambitions for the post-war world were much more than a single constituent part of 
a broader internationalist agenda; they were the vital lynchpin upon which an internationalist 
conception of the post-war world rested. 
Key to the attainment of a multilateral economic system was US diplomacy 
throughout the war with Great Britain. While the threat of the Axis powers had made an ally 
out of Britain, the country remained the principal commercial rival of the US at the outbreak 
of the Second World War. Moreover, in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
Britain had created a protectionist economic system, based on the sterling bloc and the 
imperial preference system, which discriminated against outside powers.4 Such a regime 
stood in stark contrast to the multilateral system sought by the Roosevelt administration’s 
internationalists. It was therefore to the task of breaking open Britain’s closed trade system 
and replacing it with its own multilateral model that the Roosevelt administration applied 
itself in negotiations with its wartime ally. The British government resisted this attempt for 
fear that the loss of export markets provided by Britain’s closed trading system would deny 
the country the means of achieving a healthy balance of payments in the post-war era. But 
British dependence on the US for aid meant that concessions with regard to post-war 
economic planning were inevitable.  
This process began in August 1941 when point four of the Atlantic Charter declared 
that the US and Britain would endeavour to ensure future equal access, for all countries, ‘to 
trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity’.5 
The Master Lend-Lease Agreement, signed the following February, further pledged that the 
US and Britain would work toward ‘the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment 
in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade’.6 In the 
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years following this agreement US officials sought to implement its provisions to ensure 
future US access to the British Empire and the sterling bloc.7 Similarly, US officials sought to 
challenge Britain’s traditional dominance in the Middle East in order to facilitate future US 
commercial penetration – again in the name of promoting multilateralism.8 These efforts 
were furthered during the principal wartime international conference on economic matters, 
held at Bretton Woods in July 1944. The final text of the agreements reached at the 
conference recorded the US desire ‘to bring about further agreement and cooperation among 
nations ... on ways and means which will best reduce obstacles to and restrictions upon 
international trade’.9 This process reached a conclusion with the Anglo-American financial 
agreement of December 1946, which granted Britain a loan to aid reconstruction on the 
condition that it be used ‘to assume the obligations of multilateral trade’.10 Thus, there was a 
consistent pattern throughout the Second World War – both in general negotiations and at the 
regional level – whereby the Roosevelt administration sought to ensure British acceptance of 
a multilateral economic system for the post-war world. 
The argument advanced in this paper is that US policy toward Britain in Latin 
America failed to conform to this pattern. Internationalist forces were certainly present in the 
formulation of US policy in this region. However, these were counteracted throughout the 
war years by a faction within the Roosevelt administration defined here as ‘Hemisphere 
isolationists’.11 This loose coalition was formed of various sections of the US governmental 
bureaucracy, the most important of which was the Latin Americanists in the State 
Department. Led by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, this group also included 
Laurence Duggan, Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs, and members of the Division of 
American Republic Affairs. Imbued with an in-depth knowledge of Latin America and a 
sensitivity toward the politics of the region, this group were at the forefront of guiding US 
Latin American policy during the Second World War.12 Alongside the State Department’s 
Latin Americanists, temporary government agencies, set up for specific wartime purposes, 
also played an important role in implementing US policy in Latin America. These agencies 
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often worked in close alliance with – and were indeed often represented by – US business 
interests with long-standing commercial ties to Latin America, as well as ambitions to extend 
such interests in the future.  
The Hemisphere isolationists were thus a diverse group with differing ambitions and 
separate bureaucratic functions. What they had in common was a preoccupation throughout 
the war years on Latin America, which dovetailed with a general scepticism toward Europe, 
ranging from aloof disinterest to open hostility.13 In this sense, the isolationism of this group 
was based not so much on opposition to US involvement in European affairs; the majority 
supported US intervention in the war and future participation in an international 
organisation.14 But when it came to continued European involvement in the affairs of Latin 
America, this group was instinctively hostile to such a prospect. This parochial, hemispheric 
world-view, while not necessarily directed specifically at Britain, led the Hemisphere 
isolationists to pursue policies which often threatened to exclude British interests from Latin 
America for the post-war years.  
Such a goal clearly stood in stark contradiction to the efforts of the economic 
internationalists to win British support for a global system in the post-war era based on free 
and equal access to the world’s markets and resources. Moreover, with the system of 
economic multilateralism viewed – as indeed it was by its advocates – as essential to the 
broader internationalist conception of a post-war world, the challenge to this system by 
Hemisphere internationalists in Latin America posed a severe threat to the triumph of 
internationalism during the Second World War.  
So while Hemisphere isolationists may not have been ‘traditional’ isolationists, their 
aversion to British interests in Latin America certainly did contradict internationalist 
conceptions of the post-war world. By highlighting this regional challenge to internationalism 
this paper seeks to demonstrate that variations of isolationist sentiment did indeed continue to 
find expression in the years after the US entered the Second World War. By exploring the 
impact that this faction had on Anglo-American economic diplomacy during the Second 
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World War, this paper will therefore contribute towards a more nuanced understanding of the 
ideological forces shaping transatlantic relations in these years.  
 
Sumner Welles and the Inter-American System 
British interests in Latin America by the time of the Second World War, while much 
diminished since the country’s former dominance of the region in the nineteenth century, 
were still significant. On the eve of war in 1938 Britain supplied 12 percent of the region’s 
imports and received 17 percent of its exports.15 Moreover, Britain was the principal 
customer for important South American exports like Argentine meat and Bolivian tin, and 
retained significant investment in countries like Brazil and Venezuela.16 Following Pearl 
Harbor and the subsequent US entry into the war, there was a general consensus among 
British officials that the surest means of protecting these interests was to foster a spirit of 
collaboration with the US in the region, which would entail an active role for Britain. 
Consequently, in a meeting between Lord Halifax, the British ambassador in Washington, 
and Sumner Welles on 28 December the former expressed Britain’s desire to play a 
constructive role in the affairs of Latin America. But Welles’ response was vague and 
noncommittal, giving only a brief outline of current US goals in the region that seemingly 
contained no place for Britain.17 Such an attitude on Welles’ part toward British interests in 
Latin America was reaffirmed during the first inter-American conference since the US 
entered the war, held in Rio de Janeiro during the second half of January 1942. During the 
conference British hopes of having any input on the proceedings were dashed when Welles, 
who headed the US delegation, failed to find the time to receive Sir Noel Charles, the British 
ambassador in Rio.18   
These early indications of Welles’ attitude toward British interests in Latin America 
were confirmed throughout his tenure as Under Secretary. Moreover, by the time of the 
Second World War, Welles led a powerful group of Latin Americanists within the State 
Department who shared his views toward the region and worked toward their realization. As 
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such, the contradictions that existed in Welles’ own thinking about Latin America and post-
war economic planning reflected the broader divergence between Latin Americanists and 
internationalists within the State Department.  
Welles advocated a global system of economic multilateralism for the post-war world 
in a similar vein to Cordell Hull and other internationalists. Indeed, Welles had played a 
significant role in attempting to win British support for a commitment to multilateralism in 
the Atlantic Charter declaration of 1941. As he recalled in his memoirs, his goal during these 
negotiations was to ensure that the US and Britain ‘jointly assume leadership in the post-war 
world in bringing about the elimination of autarchic trade systems, and in abolishing … 
discriminatory commercial arrangements’.19 But while Welles was certainly involved in post-
war planning with the British during the war, his principal focus was on Latin American 
policy.   
Welles had long been an authority on Latin American affairs. He first gained 
experience of the region while serving as commercial attaché in Buenos Aires during the First 
World War and later as Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs in the early 1920s. 
By the time Roosevelt came to power in 1933 Welles had developed a sophisticated 
understanding of the politics of the region, as well as fluency in Spanish.20 This expertise in 
Latin American affairs, alongside his friendship with Roosevelt, made Welles an obvious 
choice to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs in the new 
administration.21 In this role, during his brief interregnum as ambassador to Cuba, and finally 
as Under Secretary of State, Welles became the dominant figure throughout the 1930s 
implementing the administration’s Good Neighbour Policy toward Latin America.22 
Throughout this period Welles’ overriding aim was to forge an inter-American system, based 
on the principle of judicial equality between states.23  
As the threat of war in Europe loomed, the primary concern of US policy in Latin 
America – with Welles as the chief protagonist – was to engender sufficient unity among the 
American states to ensure the security of the Western Hemisphere.24 Substantial progress 
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toward this goal was made at the Buenos Aires conference in 1936 where the principle was 
established that a threat to any American state was a threat to all.25 Welles was subsequently 
successful in maintaining a degree of unity among the American states at the Rio conference 
of 1942 when all agreed to a resolution advocating the breaking of relations with the Axis 
countries, following the attack on Pearl Harbor.26 As Welles looked to the post-war era, 
maintaining the unity forged among the American states throughout the war – and therefore 
the integrity of the inter-American system – became one of his principal priorities.  
In common with most other US officials Welles believed that the inter-American 
system should serve as a model for the rest of the world to replicate in the post-war era.27 
However, while this was certainly a valid aspiration for Welles, his opinion of Europe made 
it seem an unlikely outcome. Welles viewed the major European countries of the 1930s – be 
they Axis or Allied – as unreformed imperialist powers.28 He therefore held out little hope of 
them replicating the kind of respect for sovereign equality among states, which he believed to 
have been established in the Western Hemisphere. Welles subsequently held fast to the belief 
throughout the war that ‘the cornerstone of [US] foreign policy’ in the post-war era should be 
continued participation in the inter-American system.29 
 
An ‘Economic Monroe Doctrine’ 
Welles’ dim view of the European powers, combined with his desire to preserve the integrity 
of the Inter-American system, led to a natural aversion to European influence and interests in 
Latin America as he looked toward the post-war years. Echoing the Monroe Doctrine, first 
pronounced in the nineteenth century, Welles was concerned that European powers would 
use their influence in a particular Latin American state in order to disrupt the unity of the 
inter-American system. Welles was well aware that no European power was likely to achieve 
sufficient overt political control over any Latin American country in the post-war era to 
threaten the security of the Western Hemisphere. However, throughout the war he came to 
the belief that economic domination of a Latin American country by a single European power 
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necessarily implied a threatening degree of undue political influence, which could, by 
extension, threaten hemispheric security. He subsequently formulated a post-war aim of 
eradicating European economic domination of any one Latin American country.30 
During the winter of 1942-1943 it became clear to British officials that this ambition 
on Welles’ part applied equally to Britain as to a resurgent Germany or Italy. During an 
informal conversation between Welles and Kenneth Grubb, a prominent official in the 
Ministry of Information with substantial experience of Latin America, the latter pushed 
Welles for his post-war policy toward Latin America.31 Welles sought to reassure Grubb that 
‘he was wrongly interpreted if it was supposed that he intended to make Latin America what 
was loosely called “an exclusive economic preserve for North American interests”’. Nor was 
he ‘disposed to quarrel with the rights of free enterprise in its usual form’. However, he went 
on to express his fear that ‘the countries of Europe would after the war tend to build up their 
commerce in the form of virtually state controlled corporations’. ‘Such corporations in the 
field of foreign trade’, Welles continued, ‘necessarily exercised a penetrative political 
influence, although they did so under the guise of free competition and economic assistance’. 
In order to meet the threat of European powers using a position of commercial dominance to 
disrupt the political unity of the Western Hemisphere, it was therefore necessary, Welles 
believed, for the US ‘to build up a position both in the political and economic fields which 
would enable them to occlude any such … activities’.32  
Welles justified his aversion to significant European economic interests in Latin 
America on the basis of preserving the political stability of the Western Hemisphere, and by 
extension the US security. This concern was no doubt genuine and was indeed greeted 
sympathetically by some in the British government.33 But regardless of the rationalisation 
offered by Welles for his policy toward Latin America, what remained explicit was that such 
as policy would necessarily require US commercial dominance of the region, to the exclusion 
of significant British interests. To that extent, the attitude espoused by Welles toward Latin 
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America failed to chime with the Roosevelt administration’s internationalist policy of 
economic multilateralism.  
While Welles was clearly influential in the formulation of US policy in Latin 
America, his was not the only voice in the State Department. Anglophile internationalists like 
Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson periodically sought to ensure that the principle of 
free and equal access to trade and resources did indeed apply to Britain in Latin America. In 
July 1942, for example, Acheson sent a memo to all US representatives in Latin America 
emphasising the universal application of economic multilateralism and advocating a ‘a live-
and-let-live policy’ with regard to British interests in the region.34 But the existence of these 
contradictory trends within the State Department meant that it was not possible for 
multilateralism to be advocated in a clear and consistent manner in the department’s 
diplomacy with Britain concerning Latin America.  
Although Welles had been the chief advocate of an economic Monroe Doctrine, the 
essentials of this conception of US security – albeit in a less extreme form – remained after 
his departure from office in September 1943. Specifically, while the US would not oppose 
economic penetration of Latin America by European powers per se, economic interests that 
took on a political dimension would continue to be viewed as a threat to US security in the 
post-war era, and would not, therefore, be tolerated.  
This view was made clear to Rodney Gallop, assistant to the head of the Foreign 
Office’s South American department, when he visited Washington in February 1944. In a 
meeting with Berle it was explained that the US interest in Latin America was ‘primarily 
strategic’. As a result of this concern, Berle stated, ‘the United States could not allow an 
outside Power to establish a bridgehead there. Britain’, Berle stressed, ‘was neither explicitly 
excluded nor included in this formula’.35 Similarly, in an evaluation of the State 
Department’s attitude following Welles’ departure, the British embassy in Washington 
reported that while ‘trade exchange’ between ‘non-American countries’ and Latin America 
would not be opposed by the US, this would only be permissible, ‘provided always that such 
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exchange does not offer a danger to the security of the American hemisphere by assuming a 
political complexion’.36  
Welles’ effective replacement as the leader of Latin America policy in the State 
Department came in the form of Nelson A. Rockefeller’s appointment to the newly created 
post of Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs in December 1944. 
Rockefeller’s appointment also represented a continuity of Welles’ thought when it came to 
Latin American affairs. Indeed, Rockefeller had demonstrated an exclusivist attitude toward 
the region throughout the war while heading one of the most influential temporary agencies 
operating in the region. 
 
Nelson Rockefeller and CIAA 
As a life-long Republican and a firm believer in the primacy of private enterprise and limited 
government, Rockefeller was an unlikely member of the Roosevelt administration.37 
However, his experience of Latin America gained through business investments in 
Venezuela, along with his youthful enthusiasm, impressed Roosevelt. In August 1940 the 
President consequently appointed Rockefeller head of a newly created agency to deal solely 
with issues relating to the Western Hemisphere.38 The new agency’s functions were initially 
limited to strengthening cultural ties and engendering goodwill between the American 
republics, as well unofficial action aimed at eradicating Nazi influences from the region.39  
However, in July 1941, following a change of name to the Office for the Coordinator 
of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA) the agency took on far greater responsibilities.40 These 
included promoting US-Latin American trade and the development of Latin American 
economies with US capital.41 There were certainly wartime justifications for these functions. 
Increased US trade with Latin America could compensate for the loss of the region’s 
traditional European trading partners and thereby forestall any social unrest that could 
threaten inter-American security. Similarly, the development of Latin American industry 
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could create goodwill for the US, as well as more tangible result like facilities that would 
serve strategic purposes.42  
But the growing prominence of Rockefeller’s agency in the economic affairs of Latin 
America had potential implications regarding the post-war era and was therefore a source of 
consternation to British observers. In December 1942 Halifax informed the Foreign Office of 
his concerns over Rockefeller’s organisation, noting that while it had been created as a 
temporary wartime agency, its increasing functions gave the impression ‘that it is being built 
up with an idea of permanency’. Moreover, the economic policies of Rockefeller’s agency, 
Halifax went on, ‘are bound to have very wide repercussions on the future economy of Latin 
America as well as … the relations of these countries with the rest of the world’.43  
British fears over the role of CIAA were seemingly realised when officials in London 
became aware in late 1942 that Rockefeller had secured a pledge from the US Treasury 
ensuring that advertising costs incurred by US business in Latin America would be deductible 
for federal income tax purposes.44 This governmental support for US advertising in Latin 
America struck a particular chord among British officials, as they had been actively 
restraining British firms from carrying out such promotional activities, both in order to 
preserve scarce resources and to avoid inviting criticism from the US.45 The failure on the 
part of the US government to mirror such restraint was later justified to British officials in 
Washington on the grounds that it was only by way of US advertising revenue that friendly 
newspapers in Latin America could stay in business throughout the war and continue to 
propagate pro-Allied stories.46 This reasoning was not without merit, and it was certainly one 
of the motivations that had driven Rockefeller in advocating the increase in US advertising in 
Latin America.47  
But in making the case to US business to maintain their advertising in the region 
throughout the war, Rockefeller was clear that this action would serve post-war purposes as 
well. Writing to five hundred export firms in the summer of 1942, Rockefeller stated that 
‘there is great need right now for foresighted planning and courageous effort by U.S. industry 
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to hold for the future its well earned position in the economic life of our neighbouring 
markets’.48 Writing in a US trade journal in August 1942, Rockefeller’s assistant, Joseph C. 
Rovensky, was even more explicit about the post-war aspect of wartime advertising in Latin 
America. Rockefeller’s advertising plan, stated Rovensky, is ‘a dual purpose project – it is 
both part of the nation’s war effort and a plan for enabling [US] exporters to maintain their 
trade positions in Latin America, now and after the war’. The plan, Rovensky continued, ‘has 
been conceived and is being implemented by realistic Government officials and businessmen, 
who are thinking realistically in terms of to-day and after the war’.49 
From Britain’s perspective, the promotion of US post-war trade prospects in Latin 
America, while British advertisers were being restrained from similar activities, represented a 
threat to British interests in the region. However, while Rockefeller was clearly keen to 
promote US trade in Latin America, his attitude toward European interests in the region was 
more one of disinterest than of active opposition. Of much greater concern to British officials 
were comments made by Eric Johnston.  
 
Eric Johnston and ‘Vertical Trade’ 
As both head of the US Chamber of Commerce and Chairman of the US Committee of the 
Inter-American Development Commission (IADC), Johnston had clear links both to US 
business and official Washington.50 Although a Republican and president of a body that had 
traditionally been hostile toward the New Deal, Johnston forged a close relationship with 
Roosevelt and gained a prominent role in the direction of Latin American affairs during the 
war.51 In March 1943 Johnston toured Latin America to meet with officials and businessmen 
and discuss US-Latin American trade in the post-war era.52 On completion of his trip 
Johnston gave several press conferences where he outlined his thinking on Latin American 
trade in the post-war period. In his remarks Johnston endorsed the multilateral trade 
programme, insofar as he advocated a decrease in barriers to trade between the US and Latin 
America. But he also predicted that post-war trade would tend to flow along ‘vertical lines’, 
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with the US conducting the baulk of its commerce with Latin America and European trade 
being focussed on Africa. Whereas international commerce had ‘heretofore … been mainly 
an east to west affair’, in the post-war world Johnston believed that ‘there must be an increase 
in north to south development, … particularly in the Western Hemisphere’.53 Just as the last 
century in Latin America was a ‘British Century’, stated Johnston, the next would be an 
American Century.54   
A few days later, Johnston met with Roosevelt to discuss his plans for the 
development of post-war trade in Latin America. In his subsequent report to the press on the 
meeting Johnston once again reiterated his belief in the need to remove barriers to trade in 
Latin America. However, as previously, Johnston’s comments also indicated that this 
increase in trade would only apply within the Western Hemisphere. The development of 
Latin America, stated Johnston, would be carried out by US and Latin American interests ‘on 
a fifty-fifty basis’.55   
As with his earlier remarks, this picture of post-war trade in Latin America seemed to 
hold little place for Britain. Sir Noel Charles gave his reaction to Johnston’s remarks in a 
telegram that was circulated among the War Cabinet in London. While the Roosevelt 
administration may officially advocate economic multilateralism in negotiations with Britain, 
it was comments like Johnston’s, believed Charles, which revealed the true ambitions of the 
US in Latin America.56 Similarly, Gallop noted with disapproval the failure of the State 
Department to disavow Johnston’s comments regarding the future pattern of international 
trade, despite the apparent contradiction between his views and the official US policy of 
multilateralism.57   
 
Conclusion 
The contradiction between the type of hemispheric isolationism expressed by Johnston and 
the multilateral trade programme advocated by internationalists in the State Department was 
never reconciled. As such, there remained throughout the war years, a faction within the 
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Roosevelt administration that hoped, for a number of reasons, to isolate the Western 
Hemisphere from external influence on a permanent basis. While the exclusion of British 
interests may by no means have been the primary aim of this desire, it was certainly a wholly 
foreseeable consequence. When viewed in the broader context of the Roosevelt 
administration’s attempts to promote an economic system for the post-war world based on 
free and equal access, the implications of excluding British interests from Latin America are 
worth drawing attention to. 
Protection of British export markets in Latin America was deemed by the British 
government to be an essential prerequisite of the country effectively participating in the kind 
of multilateral system that the US advocated for the post-war world. For if these markets 
were not retained for the post-war era, British officials believed, such a system would not 
provide the country the means to ensure a favourable balance of payments, essential for 
Britain’s prosperity. When Britain did embark on a post-war export drive its markets in Latin 
America had indeed in large part been lost to US competition. By 1947 US exports 
dominated throughout Latin America. In Brazil US exports constituted 61 percent of the 
country’s total imports, compared to just 7 percent supplied by Britain. In Argentina, the one-
time stronghold of British interests in Latin America, the US now supplied just under half of 
the country’s imports, whereas Britain supplied only 8 percent.58 While it is impossible to 
state to what extent the policies of the Hemisphere isolationists directly contributed to the 
loss of British influence in Latin America, their presence was certainly a significant factor. 
Albeit as part of a much broader process, this loss of export markets in Latin America – as 
predicted by British officials during the war – seriously hindered the country’s ability to 
participate in a global multilateral system in the post-war era.59 
Perhaps of greater long-term significance are the geopolitical ramifications of the 
Roosevelt administration’s failure to promote multilateralism effectively in Latin America. 
Economic multilateralism was, by its very nature, a global system. As such, any regional 
exceptions from this system could not be accommodated. To the contrary, the theory of 
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economic multilateralism stated that is was precisely the creation of closed economic spheres 
that eventually led to international conflict. As one US supporter of multilateralism predicted 
in 1943, ‘where policies give exclusive privileges to [Western] hemisphere nations, 
retaliatory measures by other economic blocs such as the British Empire … may well 
develop’.60 It was, of course, not Britain but the Soviet Union that turned out to be the 
principal rival that the US faced in the post-war era. To explore the effects of the US attitude 
toward Latin America on Soviet-American relations would take this paper beyond its natural 
limits.61 It is, however, perhaps worth pointing to the remarks of the US Deputy Director of 
Naval Intelligence, who reported in January 1946 that “Soviet current policy is to establish a 
Soviet Monroe Doctrine for the area under her shadow”.62 Again, while it is impossible to 
measure precisely the impact of the Hemisphere isolationists on the actions of other 
countries, this group’s retention of an exclusivist attitude toward Latin America was surely a 
hindrance in the Roosevelt administration’s promotion of internationalism when looking 
toward the post-war world. 
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